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Carving Out a Niche for Humanitarianism  
within the Responsibility to Protect 
 
OANA D. ALEXAN 
Macalester College 
 
“We have a responsibility in our time, as our predecessors did in theirs, not to be prisoners of history, 
but to shape it: to build a world not without conflict, but in which conflict is effectively contained; a 
world not without repression, but in which the sway of freedom is enlarged; a world not without 
lawless behavior, but in which the law-abiding are progressively more secure.”1 
 
In a world where humanitarian tragedies color the global panorama in dark shades, aid 
workers use their paintbrushes to create softer light effects. Despite the unpredictability, 
ongoing disturbances, and insecurity that characterize humanitarian aid projects, humanitarians 
strive to combat deplorable living conditions, assist refugees, and rid certain communities of 
disease. At its core, humanitarian action aims to alleviate the humanitarian symptoms of crises in 
an impartial, neutral, and independent fashion. Henry Dunant’s book Un Souvenir de Solférino 
symbolically marks the conception of modern humanitarianism, for his poignant impressions 
depicting the desperation and suffering on the battlefield near Solferino in 1859 led to the 
creation of the Red Cross. Dunant’s ideas serve as an ethical template for humanitarians, 
because their relevance continues to radiate powerfully on the humanitarian scene. Yet aid 
organizations have been accused of exacerbating humanitarian crises by limiting their scope to 
the alleviation of immediate suffering.  
Such criticism has compelled various humanitarian actors to reappraise the multiple 
dimensions of humanitarian aid operations and to evade the strict application of humanitarian 
principles. Indeed, humanitarian ideals have been stretched in ways relief workers never 
expected. Today’s humanitarian agenda—spanning long-term political, economic, security, and 
                                                        
1Madeleine Albright, “International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: A U.S. Perspective on 
Enforcement,” Fordham International Law Journal 18 (1995): 1605-1606.  
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human rights goals—appears infinite.2 These goals have complicated the deployment of 
humanitarian assistance, yet despite these transformations in the field, most humanitarians 
would assent to Fiona Terry’s claim that a “humanitarian end, such as easing the suffering of a 
population, cannot justify any means to achieve it”3—and to many humanitarians, such means 
include war. Humanitarian intervention is founded on the premise that war, whose nature 
provides the rationale for killing, may be labeled a humanitarian act if waged for humanitarian 
ends. More specifically, it is defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state 
(or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of 
the state within whose territory force is applied.”4 The U.N. Security Council has traditionally 
invoked the language of threat to or endangerment of “the maintenance of international peace 
and security” to justify humanitarian intervention. 
In fact, many humanitarian relief organizations do not intrinsically oppose military 
intervention in response to grave violations of international humanitarian law. What they do 
oppose, however, is the misleading and manipulative labeling of conflicts that contradict the 
fundamental rationale of humanitarian action. Thus, a humanitarian worker may ask, “If 
national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, is the international 
community5 supposed to stand and watch from afar as countless innocent individuals lose their 
lives?” Nations of the world merely watched the systematic slaughter of Bosnian Muslims in 
                                                        
2 Joel R. Charny, “Upholding Humanitarian Principles in an Effective Integrated Response,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 18, 2 (2004): 13.  
3 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002): 242.  
4 J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003): 18. 
5 The expression “international community” may be subject to interpretation due to the disproportionate 
involvement and decision-making power of certain states in comparison to others. Indeed, the expression is as 
widely debated as it is accepted and employed on a global scale. Yet given the expression’s common usage in the 
fields of international studies and political science, I will use it in this paper to refer to the conglomeration of 
international actors working collectively on issues of global concern. 
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Srebrenica and indeed, as Kofi Annan wrote, “the tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history 
forever.” While on the ground in Rwanda, OXFAM was the first to announce that further 
international assistance, including military assistance, was necessary to contain what they 
perceived to be an imminent genocide. Indeed, many humanitarian actors would have 
preferred that the international community intervene militarily in Rwanda at the beginning of 
the genocide to prevent the escalation of the conflict. Similarly, many lives might have been 
saved in Bosnia if humanitarianism had not been a pretext for political inaction.  
The profound sense of disillusionment and revulsion at the failure of the international 
community to act effectively in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia led to the creation of a new 
principle. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
produced a report that outlines a new doctrine, the “Responsibility to Protect” (hereafter RtoP). 
Gareth Evans, the Co-Chair of the ICISS, wrote that the “evolution away from the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention…and toward the embrace of the new concept of the responsibility to 
protect has been a fascinating piece of intellectual history in its own right.”6 The doctrine’s 
authors struggled to reconcile lessons from past humanitarian interventions with the reality that 
large-scale atrocities committed against innocent human beings will continue to plague the 
global community. RtoP stipulates that states are primarily responsible for the protection of 
their citizens from mass atrocities, that the international community should assist states in this 
endeavor, and that, if a state fails to act appropriately, the responsibility to intervene—
peacefully or in extreme cases, militarily—falls to the international community.  
My argument in this paper proceeds thus: first, I consider the ways in which 
humanitarian intervention lacks a humanitarian core and hinders relief workers’ efforts on the 
                                                        
6 Gareth Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 24: 3 (2006): 704.  
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ground. Here, I also describe the meaning of a “humanitarian space.” The second part of the 
paper outlines the framework of RtoP, emphasizing that the proper implementation of RtoP can 
safeguard humanitarianism to a greater extent and further the goals of relief workers. The final 
part of the paper considers the contributions that RtoP makes to military intervention and the 
positive advancements induced by the doctrine’s other pillars. 
 
Literature Review 
Prior to engaging my research question, I will provide a brief overview of the scholarship that 
frames the context of my research. Important ideas that I will not approach or treat extensively 
due to the limitations of the paper will emerge. Scholars have examined humanitarian 
intervention through various lenses. Some have assessed the effectiveness of past humanitarian 
interventions, offering detailed descriptions of many cases. Others have analyzed past 
experiences and have subsequently ventured to provide their audiences with a sense of 
understanding and clarity. Only in recent years have writers begun to intertwine moral 
questions—whether there is a right or duty to intervene—with political and strategic 
considerations. Much of the literature focuses on the desirable balance between state 
sovereignty and human rights. Simon Caney stands among the many scholars who defend the 
norm of nonintervention but ultimately argue that sovereignty may be overridden to further 
human rights.7 Scholars have also criticized the intersection between humanitarianism and 
humanitarian intervention, which, many argue, should not be labeled in humanitarian terms. 
My own aspirations in this paper are modest in that I will not elaborate extensively on the idea 
that military intervention is imperialism in disguise—an idea widely exposed by scholars and 
                                                        
7 Simon Caney, “Human Rights and the Rights of States: Terry Nardin on Nonintervention,” International Political 
Science Review 18: 1 (1997): 27-37. 
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practitioners. As articulated in numerous academic works, there are two main views on the 
issue: (1) hegemonic powers have an economic interest in access to raw materials and primary 
commodities; (2) humanitarian intervention embodies an ethos of democracy-building.8  
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has carved out its niche in recent literature. As an 
emerging norm, it stimulates heated debate around its practical implications. Emily Gade 
affirms, “RtoP and humanitarian interventions are examples of the way the changing nature of 
sovereignty and civilian protection norms have outpaced much of the legal framework 
underpinning international law.”9 In Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions, 
Michael Newman brings together existing work on humanitarian intervention and discusses the 
contributions and innovations of the Responsibility to Protect.10 His book stands as a 
supplement to the likes of Alex Bellamy, David Chandler, Anne Orford, Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
and Thomas G. Weiss. Some scholars such as Kurt Mills argue that the “responsibility to react” 
is “the most important, far-reaching, and innovative of the doctrine’s responsibilities due to the 
potential new duties it imposes on states and the direct challenge to sovereignty.”11 Indeed, 
writers tend to overlook RtoP’s emphasis on case-specific policies aimed at prevention, for 
example. I have encountered few scholars who thoroughly consider RtoP’s multi-faceted 
approach to humanitarian crises. Most treat the doctrine as a pale version of humanitarian 
intervention and consider its militaristic component first and foremost. Moreover, humanitarian 
considerations have not predominated throughout the literature I found on the topic. 
Subsequently, my focus will be on bridging the gap between RtoP and humanitarianism. Upon 
                                                        
8 See J.A. Bellamy and P.D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary 
Operations,” International Security 29: 4 (2005): 157-195; M. Gilligan and S. J. Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers 
Go?,” International Studies Review 5: 4 (2003): 37-54; L. L. Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or 
Self?,” Journal of Peace Research 32: 2 (1995): 181-196. 
9 Emily Kalah Gade, “Defining the Non-Combatant: How do we Determine Who is Worthy of Protection in 
Violent Conflict?,” Journal of Military Ethics 9: 3 (2010): 234. 
10 Michael Newman, Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions (New York: Columbia UP, 2009). 
11 Kurt Mills, “Vacillating on Darfur: Responsibility to Protect, to Prosecute, or to Feed?,” Global Responsibility to 
Protect 1: 4 (2009): 4. 
5
Alexan: Carving Out a Niche for Humanitarianism within RtoP
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2012
  
 6
a close examination of the doctrine, the realization that humanitarian actors may find a niche 
within its scope emerges poignantly.  
 
Relief Workers’ Beloved Humanitarian Space 
Humanitarianism may have undergone a substantial metamorphosis in the recent past, yet 
humanitarian practitioners and policy-makers continue to identify several core principles or 
values that have guided—successfully or otherwise—humanitarian action. These elements 
stand at the core of international humanitarian law and humanitarian action, constituting a 
“humanitarian space.” The universal value that fundamentally compels humanitarian action is 
humanity. Commonly identified as humanitarianism’s raison d’être, humanity denotes an aid 
giver’s dedication to alleviate human suffering in order to preserve and protect human dignity. 
The other core principles are independence, impartiality, and neutrality—the latter one 
depending greatly on a humanitarian organization’s own interpretation of its sphere of 
competence. The principle of independence reasserts an organization’s autonomy in front of 
various pressure groups—whether they be states, international organizations, or other 
authorities—and public opinion. Financial pressure should likewise not hinder humanitarian 
action. Independent decision-making strengthens the credibility and ensures the effectiveness of 
humanitarian work. Furthermore, the principle of impartiality echoes or reiterates the notion of 
equality. In other words, “[h]umanitarian endeavour aims simply to help people – be they 
friend or foe – in proportion to their need, giving priority to the most urgent cases (the principle 
of proportionality).”12 Political inclinations, religious beliefs, and ethnic or racial identities must 
bear no weight in a humanitarian’s decision to help others. Finally, the doctrine of neutrality 
                                                        
12 Daniel Thürer, “Dunant’s Pyramid: Thoughts on the ‘Humanitarian Space,’” International Review of the Red 
Cross 89: 865 (2007): 57. 
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dictates that aid givers should not take sides in political, religious, or ideological disputes. This 
value is not universally accepted by humanitarian agents, many of whom question the 
legitimacy and morality of enabling certain victims of violence—who are otherwise perpetrators 
of violence—to rehabilitate in order to produce more suffering.  
Ultimately, these values form a humanitarian space where aid givers are free to move 
and to evaluate needs, as well as to ensure the fair distribution of aid among those in need. In 
the recent past, the humanitarian space has shrunk considerably due to the heavy involvement 
of various actors such as governments, private corporations, and armed forces. 
Humanitarianism has been utilized as an alibi both for state action and inaction; moreover, 
there is an ever-increasing correlation between a state’s massive commitment to aid and its 
strategic motivations. Humanitarian intervention brings these issues to the forefront in new and 
pronounced ways. Humanitarians cannot work within the context established by military 
intervention, but they may undertake effective relief assistance within the scope of RtoP’s 
implementation. Unlike humanitarian intervention, RtoP’s multi-dimensional framework 
ensures “the possibility of creating a humanitarian space in which the spirit of humanitarian 
operations will be respected.”13  
 
Dilemmas for Humanitarianism in the Era of “Humanitarian” Military Interventions 
Public outcry at suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of authority of the 
state has undermined the principle of nonintervention, which guided interstate relations in the 
“Westphalian era.” As established in the seventeenth century, the principle of Westphalian 
sovereignty assumed that states were granted supreme authority within their territorial 
boundaries. Yet the recent interventions of foreign states in the “private affairs” of other 
                                                        
13 Terry 242. 
7
Alexan: Carving Out a Niche for Humanitarianism within RtoP
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2012
  
 8
states—beginning with the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo staged by the international 
community—have marked a departure from the Westphalian conceptualization of sovereignty 
and a move toward twentieth and twenty-first centuries rights-based sovereignty. 
Humanitarian intervention reflects the international community’s decision to prioritize 
individual rights over state sovereignty in cases of grave human rights violations. The 
recognition of human security over and above state boundaries takes a large stride toward 
global citizenship, where “each state is responsible not only to its own citizens but also to the 
citizens of the world.”14 Intervention is “humanitarian” when “its aim is to protect innocent 
people who are not nationals of the intervening state from violence perpetrated or permitted by 
the government of the target state.”15 Thus, in theory, the case for “humanitarian intervention” 
is based on humanitarianism itself. Yet despite claims that humanitarian intervention is 
inspired by humanitarian considerations, most humanitarians stress that, stripped of 
humanitarian clothes, humanitarian intervention is war. David Rieff emphasizes “the reality 
that, even at their most just and most defensible, wars involve, centrally, the slaughter of 
innocents, no matter how hard scrupulous soldiers, or their political masters, try to minimize 
such killing.”16 The logic of war supersedes the logic of humanitarianism even in humanitarian 
war. Beyond that logic, humanitarianism itself has become a moral imperative—a status that 
endows humanitarian considerations with incredible strength. As Rieff notes, 
“humanitarianism puts war beyond debate, when war should never be beyond debate” (218). 
The imperative rises above and beyond other considerations, as it happened in Bosnia, in 
                                                        
14 Gade 223. 
15 Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams, eds. Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 
2006): 1. 
16 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2002): 
284. 
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Kosovo, and in Afghanistan. The humanitarian imperative has thus been abused in the context 
of humanitarian intervention. 
The language of humanitarian intervention offends the susceptibilities of many in the 
humanitarian sector. Discourse on the “right to intervene” “focuse[s] attention on the claims, 
rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states rather than the urgent needs of 
potential beneficiaries.”17 Scholars and practitioners have argued that humanitarian 
intervention is a replay of imperialism under the guise of humanitarianism. Adopting the vision 
that there is a “right” to intervene is parallel to the old colonial norms. Dialogue between aid 
providers and the crisis’s so-called “victims” is minimal, widening the gap between external 
and internal actors. Moreover, humanitarian intervention is limited in scope as it ignores the 
potential need for preventive action or follow-up assistance—limitations I shall later juxtapose 
with the corresponding contributions of RtoP. 
 The right of intervention on humanitarian grounds has been criticized by partisans of 
humanitarian independence as endangering the humanitarian enterprise by attempting to make 
humanitarianism “the servant of state power.”18 In fact, academic literature has elevated the 
idea that “[h]umanitarian intervention is never purely humanitarian”19 to the status of a 
universally accepted truth. Many scholars argue that the international community has been 
motivated to intervene by the desire to promote and protect core values such as freedom, 
democracy, and humanitarianism. These motivations have complicated the administration of 
humanitarian intervention and have rendered certain conflicts peripheral to international 
security—despite the fact that from a humanitarian perspective, all humanitarian crises are 
equally important. Recent years have witnessed a dramatic growth in military involvement in 
                                                        
17 Michael Newman, “Revisiting the ‘Responsibility to Protect,” The Political Quarterly 80: 1 (March 2009): 94. 
18 Rieff 98. 
19 Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon International Studies Review 
42 (1998): 284. 
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relief activities, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet the motivations of the military do not 
entirely match those of humanitarian organizations—even when intervention is dressed in 
humanitarian terms. The military’s motives are intrinsically linked to an overall political 
strategy. “Humanitarian action is premised on the equal worth of all human beings, yet military 
interventions since Somalia have been selectively undertaken by governments with direct 
national interests: the French in Rwanda, the United States in Haiti, the Russians in Georgia, the 
Australians in East Timor, NATO governments in Kosovo, the Nigerians in Liberia, and the 
British in Sierra Leone.”20 When governments include humanitarian activities in the mission 
mandates of and tasks undertaken by their armed forces, humanitarian organizations and the 
military cannot retain clearly defined and distinct roles and responsibilities on the ground. 
Needless to say, the complex relationship between civilian and military personnel compromises 
the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance. Philippe Conraud 
recently noted that the perceived impartiality of UN aid agencies and NGOs is at risk in Côte 
d’Ivoire: “Aid workers have to be particularly careful in all UN integrated missions (where 
humanitarian and military UN missions are managed under the same umbrella), … ‘especially 
here where UNOCI’s actions have been controversial both in Côte d’Ivoire, and outside.’”21 
Associating with outside military forces hinders access to civilians and puts civilian lives at risk. 
Such was the case with the Kosovar refugee camps in northern Albania that were shelled by 
Yugoslav forces due to the presence of NATO troops within them. 
Moreover, misappropriating the language of “humanitarian intervention” in cases 
where armed intervention is not purely driven by humanitarian goals can be devastating for 
persecuted people in need of assistance in the future. Critics have claimed that the people of 
                                                        
20 Fiona Terry, “Military Involvement in Refugee Crises, A Positive Evolution?,” The Lancet 357: 9266 (May 2001): 
3. 
21 IRIN, “Côte d’Ivoire: Aid agencies fighting to remain impartial,” 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=92557 (April 2011). 
10
The Macalester Review, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macreview/vol2/iss1/1
  
 11
Darfur are victims of this rhetoric. Alluding that the Iraq war was not a humanitarian 
intervention, Sudan’s parliamentary speaker, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Tahir, warned against 
intervention in his country, saying: “If Iraq opened one gate of hell for the West, we will open 
seven of its gates. We will not surrender this country.”22  
 
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) articulated the 
idea of the “responsibility to protect” as it sought to develop a new normative framework that 
would ensure that there were no more mass killings or ethnic cleansings. The Commission 
responded to Kofi Annan’s explicit plea that the international community avoid future 
Rwandas and Kosovos. The debate over sovereignty versus intervention was reframed in terms 
of the responsibility to protect. States adopted RtoP in 2005. The doctrine’s authors insisted that 
achieving international consensus required a change in terminology and the adoption of a new 
discourse, one incorporating different emphases and nuances. The development of RtoP 
represents an evolution in international norms. Its core commitments are worth quoting due to 
their revolutionary overturn of established international law, namely the endorsement of 
national jurisdiction free from external intervention: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it… 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
                                                        
22 BBC News, “Sudan Grudgingly Accepts UN Vote” ( September 9, 2004). See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3670590.stm. 
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case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity…23 
 
For one, states are entrusted with the primary responsibility to protect the security of their 
citizens. Should they fail to do so, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect. The responsibility is threefold: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. This 
triad is to be undertaken on a case by case, hence discretionary, basis. In other words, when the 
host state manifestly fails in its responsibility to protect its citizens, states—as members of the 
international community—agree to use all peaceful means to protect vulnerable populations. If, 
and only if, these peaceful measures fail or constitute an inappropriate approach to the crisis, 
the Security Council may mandate the use of any means necessary, including non-consensual 
force. By incorporating both peaceful and coercive means of preventing or bringing mass 
atrocities to an end, RtoP constitutes a real conceptual change from humanitarian intervention. 
As I mentioned before, “[h]umanitarian relief is increasingly seen as giving Western 
governments the appearance of ‘doing something’ in the face of a tragedy while providing an 
alibi to avoid making a riskier political or military commitment that could address the ‘roots of 
the crisis.’”24 RtoP’s emphasis on “responsibility” has the potential to translate into a deeper 
political commitment to protection, thus reducing the possibility that governments intervene ad 
hoc merely to further their own political agendas or that they evade involvement. On a similar 
note, “many civil society groups and agencies feel that the root of many of their problems in 
attempting to protect civilians lie in being unable to engage political will from key states in a  
                                                        
23 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Council, (2001). 
24 David Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 699. 
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timely manner, and then convert this will into practical assistance.”25 The RtoP doctrine holds 
such a promise. The notion of an international responsibility to protect persons in need of 
humanitarian assistance frames the international community’s actions within the concept of 
humanitarianism—as providing protection and relief from suffering. Put simply, RtoP comes 
into play in response to needs, which may enable states to move beyond issues of sovereignty 
and security. The emphasis on needs rather than on a “right to intervene” has calmed the 
debate between the global North and the global South—a development that largely avoids 
imperialist allegations. ”If allowed to achieve its potential, RtoP can develop into an effective 
multi-layered response to humanitarian crises. Humanitarianism is already embedded within, 
rather than at the margins of, contemporary conflict. Provided the development of RtoP, relief 
workers could locate a niche within the multi-faceted paradigm established by the doctrine in 
order to facilitate its proper implementation. 
My aspirations in this paper are modest in that I will but briefly address the operational 
shortcomings of RtoP. Scholars have identified the problematic dimensions that lie at the heart 
of RtoP in the contemporary global context. Not only is it hard to mobilize political will to act 
and overcome the scarce capacities of international actors, but also interveners have recently 
encountered domestic resistance against international engagement. Implementing preventive 
strategies has proven to be a complex matter since most states resist to be put on a watch list for 
fear of tainting their international reputation. Moreover, political blockades in the international 
response to mass atrocities can prevent timely action. Yet scholars have also sought remedies 
and given subsequent advice to counter such shortcomings. For one, an array of actors—sub-
regional organizations, civil society organizations, human rights groups, humanitarian 
                                                        
25 Susan Harris Rimmer, “Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and the ‘Responsibility to Protect,” Policy 
Development and Evaluation Service 185 (2010): 5. 
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organizations—can work to build the infrastructure necessary for RtoP. As will emerge from 
my paper later on, humanitarians can play an important role in strengthening implementation. 
 
The RtoP Doctrine’s Contributions to Military Intervention and Its Proper Implementation 
RtoP sends the message that humanitarian concern cannot be used as a pretext for intervention. 
Nonetheless, some members of the international community are concerned that RtoP is “simply 
a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing and hence legitimizing humanitarian 
intervention.”26 They suspect that RtoP is a “Trojan horse” for the legitimization of unilateral 
intervention. Yet RtoP can reduce the international community’s temptation to focus exclusively 
on military responses to grave humanitarian problems, since, far from enabling non-consensual 
military intervention, the doctrine is an important mechanism for constraining the use of force. 
RtoP limits the scope of the intervention agenda to four internationally codified cases: genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. These thresholds for military 
intervention are meant to constrain governments’ ability to abuse RtoP and limit the scope of 
potential Security Council interventionism.27 Ramesh Thakur argues that RtoP’s criteria 
prevents states from misappropriating the language of humanitarianism for geopolitical and 
unilateral interventions. In cases not meeting the thresholds, RtoP urges merely non-coercive 
protection measures such as humanitarian assistance. “This is why Western powers’ choice to 
send humanitarian assistance rather than intervene militarily in Chechnya, where just cause 
arguably existed but the requirements of right authority, proportionality and likelihood of 
success would not have been met, was perfectly consistent with R2P doctrine.”28 Humanitarian 
                                                        
26 Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention,” International Affairs 
84, 4 (2008) 616. 
27 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect 
(Cambridge: CU Press, 2007) 260. 
28 Charli Carpenter, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” Small Wars Journal (March 28, 2011). 
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actors can rejoice in that, according to RtoP, states cannot claim a humanitarian mantle for 
armed intervention. 
Furthermore, the doctrine intends to minimize the gap between intervening militarily 
and doing nothing, for it offers a wide array of options ranging from diplomatic pressure to 
economic and political sanctions. Military coercion emerges as a last resort. Alex Bellamy 
writes, “by incorporating political and diplomatic strategies alongside legal, economic and 
military options, R2P points toward holistic strategies of engagement that can overcome the 
temptation to visualize complex problems in exclusively military terms.”29 However, the 
international community continues to struggle with separating RtoP from military action. The 
international responses to the crisis in Darfur and to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar/Burma 
illustrate the international community’s temptation to conflate the two. In regards to the crisis 
in Darfur, activists and political leaders advocated for the implementation of RtoP through the 
deployment of military forces with little consideration to the doctrine’s other tenets. Despite the 
military junta’s inability to respond effectively to the crisis in Burma, the government permitted 
limited external humanitarian action. External political leaders, such as at the French foreign 
minister Bernard Kouchner, once again tied RtoP with proposals for the use of military force in 
order to secure the delivery of aid to Burma. The international community should shift its focus 
from RtoP’s militaristic component and consider the other commitments associated with RtoP. I 
will later focus on the non-coercive measures to prevent and to protect vulnerable populations. 
The protection of civilians stands at the heart of RtoP and has positive implications for 
humanitarian work. In 2004, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs reported that “the lack of security remains the predominant and most visible threat to 
                                                        
29 Bellamy 630. 
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access”30 to populations affected by conflict. Protection from violence is a task that 
humanitarian organizations are unable to assume effectively, but positive peace-supporting 
activities can be linked to the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid in war situations. 
Indeed, well-organized peace operation may succeed in effectively protecting vulnerable 
citizens and ensuring access for relief workers. The mandate for the RtoP-based mission in 
Sudan, for example, reads, UMMIS was mandated “to facilitate and coordinate, within its 
capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary 
security.”31 Gaining and maintaining access to the most vulnerable people in conflict is critical 
to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection. Thus, humanitarian personnel can 
benefit from such mandates that facilitate their access to victims.  
As with all interventionist operations, including humanitarian action, implementing 
RtoP can have potential unintended consequences. The international community can avoid 
these effects through a thorough examination of the crisis. After all, the “definition of a situation 
very much matters: How bystanders see it and what sense they make of it shapes their 
actions.”32 Alan Kuperman provides several suggestions for the positive implementation of 
RtoP. Unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate, he argues, the international 
community should refuse to intervene in any way. The international community should retain 
RtoP’s intervention option for extreme cases in order “to discourage states from responding 
disproportionately to rebellion by intentionally harming civilians.”33 This approach would serve 
                                                        
30 2004 Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, “Strengthening Humanitarian Action in Conflict: Defining 
the Parliamentary Role,” 19-20 October 2004. 
31 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1590, 24 March 2005. 
32 Ervin Staub, “The Origins and Prevention of Genocide, Mass Killing, and Other Collective Violence,” Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 5:4 (1999): 318. 
33 Alan J. Kuperman, “Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations (2009): 26. 
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as an incentive toward less violent action for all parties in civil conflicts. Humanitarian aid, such 
as food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical care, must be delivered in a manner that 
minimizes the benefits to rebels, many of whom intercept aid convoys and transform refugee 
camps into training and recruitment centers. Installing security systems and networks may 
prevent such problematic developments. Moreover, external actors should attempt to persuade 
states to address the grievances of non-violent domestic groups in their midst. Also, they 
should abstain from appropriating territory or authority to a domestic opposition without the 
implementation of preventive measures against a potentially violent backlash.  
 
Conflict Prevention and RtoP 
One of the  humanitarian sector’s most conservative members, the ICRC, presented its stance on 
armed intervention: 
While armed intervention in response to grave violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law may be unavoidable in certain extreme 
situations, what we expect of the community of States is that they should not 
view either such intervention or the situations that have caused it as inevitable. 
To systematically use armed intervention for humanitarian purposes would 
amount to an abdication by the international community of its true 
responsibilities: preventing conflict and promoting the basic values expressed in 
international humanitarian law.34 
 
It is surprising that the ICRC identifies conflict prevention as one of the international 
community’s principal responsibilities given the organization’s strong commitment to 
humanitarian principles. But the ICRC’s realization matches the ICSS’s acknowledgement that 
“[i]t is very often the very policies of outside states, nonstate actors, international organizations, 
and the international financial institutions (IFIs) that exacerbate the grinding poverty, 
inequality, poor governance, and patrimonial politics that are often identified as the root causes 
                                                        
34 Anne Ryniker, “The ICRC’s Position on ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” IRRC 83: 842 (June 2001): 532. 
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of armed conflict.”35 36 As I mentioned earlier in my paper, RtoP offers a richer conceptual 
framework than humanitarian intervention. The doctrine’s authors have stressed that the 
prevention pillar is at the heart of RtoP. Preventive intervention tends to consist of a response to 
situations where the momentum toward violence against a vulnerable population has already 
been established.  
Ervin Staub argues that “[p]overty, the experience of injustice, and social and 
psychological disorganization that prevents the meeting of basic human needs in a rapidly 
changing world tend to lead people to turn to ethnic, religious, national, or other ‘identity’ 
groups to strengthen individual identity and to gain support and security”37—which often leads 
to collective violence. The relationships between social conditions and violence are complex and 
multidimensional, yet passivity by external bystanders encourages perpetrators and thus, it is 
not a viable option. Humanitarians can work to reduce the potential of violence by adopting 
prevention measures, particularly in areas where the basic human needs of individuals are not 
fulfilled. Humanitarians can play a key role in healing and rebuilding communities to improve 
individual lives and avoid continued violence.  
Humanitarian absolutists that abide by humanitarian principles may rejoice in that 
“diplomatic ideas of prevention are associated with early warning, preventive diplomacy and 
crisis management”38 rather than with the root causes of conflict such as economic inequality 
and underdevelopment. Their involvement in crises can thus prioritize the alleviation of 
suffering over remedying its root causes. RtoP’s emphasis on prevention may reduce the 
                                                        
35 Alex J. Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” Journal of Global Governance 14 (2008): 
150. 
36 Anne Orford also asserts that “resort to the use of force as a response to security and humanitarian crises 
continues to mean that insufficient attention is paid to the extent to which the policies of international institutions 
themselves contribute to creating the conditions that lead to such crises” in “Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the 
Narratives of New Interventionism,” European Journal of International Law 10: 4 (1999): 681. 
37 Staub 304. 
38 Rimmer 11. 
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politicization of aid since humanitarians may have the opportunity to operate in an 
environment that is less divided along political or ideological lines.  
Crisis management activities flow from an armed conflict already in flight. Components 
of conflict prevention under this conception point to a human security approach. Indeed, the 
stress upon the wider human security agenda was an integral part of the ICSS’s report. Born in 
the policy world, the concept of human security was first employed in the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report. The UNDP vision of human security was broad, encompassing various 
dimensions, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and 
political security. The object of security shifted from an exclusive stress on territorial security 
from external aggression to a greater stress on individuals and communities and the multiple 
threats to security that they face in their own lives. Focusing on the concept of human security 
means adopting a bottom-up or local approach to security. In practical terms, human security is 
about ensuring basic human needs in economic, health, food, social and environmental terms. 
On the other hand, it is about removing the use, or threat, of force and violence from people’s 
everyday lives.  
Michael Newman writes, “Human security concentrates on the following distinct, but 
interrelated, areas concerned with conflict and poverty: protecting people during violent 
conflict and in post-conflict situations; defending people who are forced to move; overcoming 
economic insecurities; guaranteeing the availability and affordability of essential health care; 
and ensuring the elimination of illiteracy, educational deprivation and schools that promote 
intolerance.”39 This notion of “human security” has the merit of connecting a wide array of 
phenomena that cause deprivation and suffering—phenomena whose familiarity to relief 
workers is by no means limited in scope. Thus, the concept of human security shines a spotlight 
                                                        
39 Newman, Humanitarian Intervention, 186-187. 
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on the role that humanitarian workers can play in conflict prevention. The RtoP doctrine 
focuses attention on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance. And the “notion 
of international action for the purposes of human protection paradoxically [provides] a stronger 
link with the idea of humanitarianism than had been the case with the previous discourse”40 of 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
RtoP’s Role in Linking External and Local Actors to Ensure Humanitarian Effectiveness 
Anne Orford states that the RtoP doctrine “stands in a complicated relationship to a long 
tradition of absolutist or authoritarian state theorising in which the relation between state and 
subject was figured in terms of protection and obedience.”41  Yet the doctrine’s authors strived 
to eliminate this dichotomy in order to achieve consensus at the international level and avoid 
placing the beneficiaries of aid in a passive, accepting role that undermines their sense of 
agency. A key feature of RtoP’s human security component is its focus on individuals—an 
aspect that targets the empowerment of affected persons in conflict situations. Moreover, RtoP 
stresses that the international community assist crisis-affected countries reach their potential 
and ensure the security of their citizens on their own. Encouraging states to commit to capacity-
building assistance is the first step in treating existing or potential humanitarian crises. Direct 
and pronounced interventionist measures are considered only when local efforts and every 
attempt to support them internationally fail. Thus, international intervention is subsidiary to the 
failure of local actors. This means that RtoP recasts intervention as a means to support self-
rescue and resistance efforts. 
                                                        
40 Newman, Revisiting, 95. 
41 Orford, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Politicization of International Law,” Workshop at RegNet, ANU 
(2008). 
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In general, humanitarian assistance itself rests upon a problematic relationship between 
external and local actors. Scholars have highlighted the gap in perceptions and expectations that 
exists between external and local actors. In the context of humanitarian crises, “it is essential to 
understand why people rely on self-help—at the basic individual, family or community levels—
to achieve their own security, and under what circumstances they may have enough trust to 
pass over the provision of that security to political institutions.”42 People will entrust their 
security to others under complex conditions, but interventionist mechanisms can be effective 
only when the international community holds a legitimate place of trust in the affected 
community. RtoP may foster understanding of the local context and may prevent external 
actors from reifying cultural practices—a tendency obscuring the reality that matters are in fact 
more fluid. The humanitarian space “entails the freedom to forge a relationship with the people 
[relief workers] are there to help—to listen to their stories and discuss their predicament as the 
first step to really respecting their dignity.”43 RtoP’s authors stress the importance of dialogue 
between international actors and local ones, and guaranteeing human security (in accordance to 
the doctrine’s preventive paradigm) may ensure the possibility of dialogue.  
Not only can aid provided in conflict settings exacerbate the conflicts that cause the 
suffering it is meant to alleviate, but also humanitarian assistance can lead to dependency on 
the part of those who receive it. Mary Anderson argues that humanitarian aid workers “often 
adopt a mode of operation that assumes that victims of crises can do little or nothing for 
themselves.”44 Yet adopting efficient delivery systems is ineffective when the role of local 
people is minimal or nonexistent. RtoP encourages providers of aid to recognize that the so-
                                                        
42 Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke, “Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments,” 
Security Dialogue 36, 4 (2005) 453. 
43 Terry 242. 
44 Mary B. Anderson, “ ‘You Save My Life Today, But for What Tomorrow? Some Moral Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Aid,” in Jonathan Moore, ed. Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Boston: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998): 139. 
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called “victims” of crises have capacities—such as materials, social systems, attitudes, and 
beliefs—they can benefit from. Aid providers should recognize these local capacities and supply 
aid in ways that support them—thus building and strengthening “a foundation on which their 
future independent development can occur.”45 In addition to providing basic supplies needed 
for survival, humanitarian workers on RtoP missions should encourage community interaction 
and planning. And an assessment of local capacities should always complement a needs 
assessment, for “[w]hen providers trust and respect recipients, they approach their job as 
workers alongside those needing help.”46 For example, the Engaging Civil Society Project has 
aimed to strengthen partnership-building efforts between RtoP-based missions and local civil 
society organizations. The project has facilitated advocacy and implementation of RtoP around 
the world. Engaging local society is important if the international community is to help states 
help themselves first. 
 
Conclusion 
Humanitarian intervention is meant to stop large-scale atrocities committed against innocent 
human beings. Its raison d’être is thus founded in ethical considerations—the moral duty to stop 
actions that shock the conscience of mankind. Yet humanitarian intervention often represents a 
significant departure from humanitarianism per se. Given the devastation inherent in war and 
the fact that military action is the antithesis of humanitarianism, or the alleviation of suffering, 
armed intervention cannot merely adopt a “humanitarian” mask. The international community 
has proposed alternate methods of intervention to complement and even substitute military 
intervention. The political, economic, and social dimensions that underpin conflicts resulting in 
                                                        
45 Anderson 142. 
46 Anderson 31. 
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massive human rights violations or loss of human lives should be taken into consideration 
when intervening. It is important to develop criteria that differentiate between self-serving 
interventions and assistance guided by and executed according to humanitarian goals. RtoP 
shifts the conversation from an emphasis on justifying just wars through humanitarian 
imperatives to one on humanitarianism’s niche within RtoP’s richer conceptual framework. 
“Debates about the possibilities, limits and dangers promised by international 
intervention have been central to the shaping of a new post-Cold War internationalism.”47 An 
interventionist response to humanitarian crises, RtoP is an emerging norm that has captured the 
hearts of hopeful individuals around the globe.48 Rather than endorsing the perspective that 
RtoP is humanitarian intervention with a mask, humanitarian actors can dare to embrace this 
new doctrine. By capitalizing on RtoP’s contributions to military intervention, humanitarians 
could deliver better protection to vulnerable populations and reduce the most suffering. 
Humanitarian participation in the early response to crises can avoid exacerbating conflicts. RtoP 
attempts to unlock ideological blockades beyond geopolitical and economic interests within its 
multi-layered framework. The doctrine acknowledges that the “challenge to humanitarian 
agencies and their staffs is to assist people in ways that enable them to create safer and more 
secure futures for themselves, and thus to contribute not only to the relief of immediate dire 
suffering but also to the ultimate prevention of the emergencies that cause this suffering.”49 
                                                        
47 Orford 679. 
48 To say the least, the RtoP debate has been framed so as to bridge the gap between the global North and the 
global South. The doctrine’s authors have struggled to reconcile the past’s lessons with the present’s needs.  
49 Anderson 37. 
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